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Abstract 
Whether unconscious stimuli can modulate the preparation of a cognitive task is still 
controversial. Using a backward masking paradigm, we investigated whether the modulation 
could be observed even if the prime was made unconscious in 100% of the trials. In two 
behavioral experiments, subjects were instructed to initiate a phonological or semantic task on 
an upcoming word, following an explicit instruction and an unconscious prime.  When the 
SOA between prime and instruction was sufficiently long (84 ms), primes congruent with the 
task set instruction led to speedier responses than incongruent primes. In the other condition 
(36 ms), no task set priming was observed. Repetition priming had the opposite tendency, 
suggesting the observed task set facilitation cannot be ascribed solely to perceptual repetition 
priming. Our results therefore confirm that unconscious information can modulate cognitive 
control for currently active task sets, providing sufficient time is available before the 
conscious decision. 
 
Keywords: Consciousness; Masking; Cognitive control; Task switching; Semantic 
judgment; Phonological judgment 
 
 
UNCONSCIOUS TASK SET PRIMING  3  
 
Unconscious Task Set Priming With Phonological and Semantic Tasks 
 
1. Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that information not consciously perceived can influence our 
perception and behavior, and subliminal priming has been demonstrated at visual, semantic 
and motor levels (for a recent review, see Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). Non-conscious 
information can modulate performance in many cognitive tasks, eg. object recognition 
(Stoerig & Cowey, 1997), extraction of the meaning of words (Gaillard et al., 2006; Naccache 
& Dehaene, 2001; Van den Bussche, Notebaert, & Reynvoet, 2009), categorization (Van den 
Bussche & Reynvoet, 2007), emotional processing (Whalen et al., 1998), action planning and 
execution (Binsted, Brownell, Vorontsova, Heath, & Saucier, 2007).  Recently, it has been 
reported that monetary rewards affected subjects' motivation in a force task (Pessiglione et al., 
2007), a finger-tapping task  (Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2010, 2012) and a switch task 
(Capa, Bouquet, Dreher, & Dufour, 2012) even though participants were unaware of the 
reward.  
However, the extent to which non-conscious stimuli influence high-order control 
functions remains controversial in cognitive psychology. Cognitive control processes have 
traditionally been considered to be based on voluntary control and to depend on conscious 
decision-making and awareness. As such, they have been contrasted with unconscious, 
automatic information activation. According to the global neuronal workspace framework 
(Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006), top-down strategic processes can 
influence unconscious processing (Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995; Naccache, Blandin, & 
Dehaene, 2002; Van den Bussche, Segers, & Reynvoet, 2008), but the possibility of an effect 
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of non-conscious stimuli on cognitive control processes is not explicitly included in the model 
(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). 
1
 
Recent findings suggest subliminal stimuli can affect high-order cognitive processes 
such as inhibitory control or task-setting.  In a go/no go task, for instance, non-conscious 
“stop” signals slow down motor responses. This inhibitory control, which occurs unbeknown 
to the subject, is associated with a frontal activity typically related to response inhibition in 
both electroencephalographic (Hughes, Velmans, & Fockert, 2009; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, 
Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
(Van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010) studies. These findings are evidence that 
inhibitory control can be triggered unconsciously.  
Another set of studies has addressed the activation of task sets by masked stimuli that 
do not reach consciousness (Lau & Passingham, 2007; Mattler, 2003; Reuss, Kiesel, Kunde, 
& Hommel, 2011). The concept of task set assumes we can adopt a particular configuration of 
our cognitive system to perform a given task (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Mattler et al. 
instructed participants to indicate either a sound’s timbre (piano versus marimba) or its pitch 
(high versus low). A shape (task cue) indicated which task they were to perform, with 
diamonds denoting the pitch task and squares the timbre task. Before the fully visible task cue 
was presented, there was a prime in the shape of either a diamond or square. The task cue 
acted as a metacontrast for the prime so that the latter was either visible or invisible 
depending on the delay between prime and task cue onsets. The results signaled a congruency 
effect for subliminal primes: participants responded faster when the shapes of the prime and 
cue were the same than when they were different. These findings suggested that subliminal 
primes triggered the establishment of a cognitive task set which shortened the preparation 
time for the task when the visible cue occurred.  
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Using a similar paradigm in a fMRI study, Lau and Passingham (2007) reported that, 
relative to congruent trials, in incongruent trials increased activity was observed in brain 
regions associated with the task cued by the subliminal prime, whereas reduced activity was 
reported in brain regions associated with the task cued by the visible instruction. These results 
demonstrated that the task-related network can be modulated by subliminal information.  
There are methodological concerns surrounding these important studies which could 
undermine their conclusions. Firstly, in all of them the absence of awareness of masked 
primes cannot be taken for granted in all subjects.  In the Mattler study (2003), for example, 
participants’ performance when they had to identify the shapes of the subliminal primes was 
at best only marginally different from chance, around 55 % (d’=0.28), and in the worst case, 
close to 60 % (i.e. above-chance). In the Lau and Passingham study (2007), discriminability 
in the low-visibility condition was lower (d’=0.05), but the difference in relation to the 
conscious condition was quite small (d’=0.26), with the latter result equivalent to the Mattler 
unconscious condition. It is possible these results are due to the choice of masking by 
metacontrast. Secondly, the presence of conscious primes in the same block as masked primes 
might have had an effect on the visibility of the prime, by creating an expectation of a 
stimulus, which has been shown to speed information processing (Vangkilde, Coull, & 
Bundesen, 2012), and might have facilitated the priming effect (Naccache et al., 2002). All in 
all, it still seems necessary to check whether task-set priming effects can be replicated in strict 
conditions where subjects are unaware of the primes. To that end, we used a backward 
masking paradigm in which a single letter displayed only briefly was followed 24 ms later by 
a mask consisting of letters surrounding the previous letter location (Del Cul, Baillet, & 
Dehaene, 2007; Del Cul, Dehaene, & Leboyer, 2006). It has previously been shown that both 
objective measures (proportion of primes correctly identified) and the subjective visibility of 
the primes reported by participants indicated they were not aware of the presentation of the 
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primes under these experimental conditions. Furthermore, unlike all previous studies, which 
combined trials with conscious primes with trials with masked primes, we did not include any 
trials with conscious primes. 
Another methodological issue concerns the double dissociation between priming effect 
and visibility reported in the study by Lau and Passingham (2007): the priming effect was 
maximal when the prime visibility was minimal but disappeared when participants 
consciously perceived the prime (see also Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). The absence of an 
effect of a visible prime on the task set selection could be due to an excessively too short 
delay between the prime and the task cue in the conscious condition (16 ms) compared with 
the subliminal condition (83 ms).  It has already been shown that the efficiency of visible 
primes generally increases as a function of the prime-target delay (Kouider & Dehaene, 
2007). Two factors were therefore confounded: the visibility of the prime and the delay 
between prime and instruction. The confound is due to the use of metacontrast masking 
characterized by a U-shaped visibility curve as the delay between prime and instruction 
increases. In the present study we examine the impact of this delay manipulation while 
keeping constant the SOA between prime and mask. 
The purpose of the present study was to provide more evidence proving that a 
subliminal prime could initiate a task set. We designed a different masking procedure to 
overcome the methodological issues raised by the study by Lau and Passingham (2007). First 
of all, we were intent on making sure the participants really were unaware of the prime. Even 
if it is difficult to demonstrate statistically that visibility is exactly zero, it is known that 
metacontrast masking rarely produces complete masking at any level of SOA (Francis, 1997). 
Here, we used backward masking which allows no visibility of the prime, as previously 
shown by objective performance and subjective ratings (Del Cul et al., 2007, 2006). Secondly, 
primes were subliminal in all trials to avoid any clue that might have modified the 
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participants’ attentional focus. Thirdly, to study the impact of the delay between the 
subliminal prime and the mask, we compared two intervals between prime and instruction in 
two different experiments. Fourthly, to gain a better understanding of the links between the 
repetition priming and task set priming, we used both tasks in the same experimental 
procedure. Each participant performed a task set priming task, followed by a repetition 
priming task (motor response priming). 
 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants. Twenty students from the University of Strasbourg (16 women, 4 
men), aged between 19 and 44 (M=24.7, SD=5), took part in the experiment. Their level of 
education ranged from 12 to 16 years (M=14.8, SD=1.47). All of them had normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity, verified with the help of  the Freiburg Visual Acuity Test 
(Bach, 2006). Each participant took part in one 90 minute session. Their informed written 
consent was obtained prior to the study, in accordance with the recommendations set out in 
the Helsinki Declaration.  
2.1.2 Equipment. Participants were seated 60 cm from the stimulus presentation screen 
in a dimly lit room for the duration of the experimental session. The behavioral tasks were 
presented using E-prime version 1.1 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc. Sharpsburg, PA). The 
screen refresh rate was set at 85 Hz (screen refresh every 11.8 ms). Responses were collected 
with a serial response box (Psychology Software Tools, Inc. Sharpsburg, PA). 
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2.1.3 Stimuli. In each trial, the prime was displayed first, and then followed by a mask, 
the instruction letter, and the target word. The prime was a letter (A or S, Arial font, size: 
1.25°) presented in one of four positions (2.3° above or below and 2.3° to the right or left of 
the central fixation cross). 
The mask consisted of 4 letters surrounding the previous position of the prime (two E 
above and below, and two M on left and right). The mask served to render the prime invisible. 
The instruction consisted of a letter (A or S), the same size as the prime, but in bold font and 
colored blue. It was presented in the square delimited by the mask furthest from the fixation 
cross. NB: As a result, the instruction letter never appeared in exactly the same location as the 
prime (Figure 1). 
2.1.4 Procedure. The participants completed a three-phase procedure. They started with 
a task set priming task, which involved applying one of two strategies according to an 
instruction letter that could change with every trial. Secondly, they performed a repetition 
priming task, where they had to identify the letter representing the instruction, which in this 
task is the target letter. Thirdly, they were told about the presence of a congruent or 
incongruent invisible prime before performing a prime identification task.   
Task set priming. An instruction letter presented on the screen indicated the type of 
judgment the subjects would have to emit on the following word. In the case of an “S” 
instruction (like “Syllabic”) the participants had to make a phonological judgment: they had 
to decide whether or not the word was bisyllabic. In the case of an “A” instruction (like 
“Animate”), they had to make a semantic judgment: they had to decide whether the word 
corresponded to something living or non-living. The volunteers were told they had to prepare 
the task set quickly once they had seen the instruction. They were not told about the presence 
of an invisible prime. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the experimental stimuli and procedure. The fixation cross was 
displayed throughout the session. In each trial, the prime was presented for 12 ms. After a 
24 ms delay during which the screen remained blank, the mask and instruction letter appeared 
together for 152 ms, in the same quarter of the screen as the preceding prime. Thus, the 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between prime and mask, as well as between prime and 
instruction, was 36 ms. After a delay of 156 ms during which the screen remained blank 
(344 ms after the onset of the prime) the target word was presented at the center of the screen 
for 750 ms. The next trial began 3 seconds after the word offset.  
The volunteers responded “yes” by pressing a key with their left index finger and “no” 
by pressing a key with their right index finger. They were instructed to respond as accurately 
and as quickly as possible, within 3 seconds of the word onset.  
Each participant completed four blocks of 96 trials each (384 trials). In half the trials, 
the task was phonological, and in the other half, semantic. Within each of these conditions, 
the prime was congruent with the instruction in half the trials, and incongruent in the other 
half. In our pilot studies, switching instructions between consecutive trials seemed to be an 
important factor to control and was taken into account in the study design. Trials with and 
without task switching between consecutive trials (switch vs. no-switch) were displayed in 
equal proportions. The fillers, i.e. the first trial in a sequence of two trials, were not included 
in the statistical analyses. The participants were not told about the fillers, and the temporal 
course of fillers and target trials was exactly the same. Conditions of task, congruency, task 
switching, and the position of the stimuli (a total of 32 possible combinations) were 
represented in the same proportions. The same word was never repeated between two 
consecutive trials. 
Twenty-four different French nouns were used. Their occurrence ranged from 0.68 to 
56 per million (Lexique Database: New, Pallier, Ferrand, & Matos, 2001). The words were 
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either bi- or trisyllabic, and denoting something either animate or inanimate, in equal 
proportions. Words that were ambiguous in terms of syllables or meaning were excluded. We 
chose a small number of words to accelerate decision-making and reduce the variability of 
RTs.  
To avoid unwanted response strategies, the responses were systematically incongruent 
in both tasks: all trisyllabic words corresponded to something animate, and bisyllabic words 
to something inanimate.  Unbeknown to the participants, the selection of words with intrinsic 
response incongruence (“yes” for one task and “no” for the other) avoids automatic responses 
based solely on their memory of stimulus-response pairs. We checked to make sure subjects 
did not consciously employ a strategy of using the same judgment in all cases and reversing 
the responses according to the instructions given.  A questionnaire filled in at the end of the 
procedure was designed specifically to hunt out such a strategy. The questions were open to 
begin with, and then steadily more targeted to focus on the strategies used during the 
procedure. Three subjects had noticed that bisyllabic words were inanimate and trisyllabic 
words animate, leading them to use the afore-mentioned strategy. These three participants 
were excluded from the analyses. 
The experiment was divided into four 12-minute runs, between which the participants 
were allowed a 5-minute rest to ensure their sustained attention. A training session 
beforehand, consisting of 100 trials, allowed us to check whether or not the instructions were 
properly understood. The instructions were presented on the computer screen and oral 
explanations were also given. 
Repetition priming. The stimuli (prime, mask and instruction, and word) and their 
temporal course were identical to the task set priming procedure, including the use of filler 
trials. Only the task was different. Participants were asked to focus their attention on the 
instruction letter, which is the target in this phase, and to press, as quickly as possible, the 
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right button in the case of an “A” letter and the left button in the case of an “S” 
(counterbalanced between subjects). Participants completed one block of 128 trials.  
Measurement of prime awareness. Following the two priming tasks, participants were 
asked whether they had noticed anything other than the E and the M in the mask. They were 
then told that a prime had been presented and were asked once again whether they had noticed 
anything before the mask and the instruction letter. Afterwards, they were shown the exact 
stimulus sequence in slow motion and were asked if they recognized having seen any of the 
primes during the priming task. Finally, the prime identification task was conducted, 
consisting of one block of 128 trials. The stimuli and time course were the same as in the two 
previous tasks. Participants were asked to identify the prime, and to respond by pressing one 
of the two buttons (counterbalanced between subjects), even if they were unable to see it 
(forced choice). Lastly, they were asked whether or not they felt they were able to see the 
masked primes during the prime identification task. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
 
2.1.5 Statistical analyses. We conducted ANOVAs with repeated measures, prime 
congruency (prime and target identical vs. different), task (semantic vs. syllabic), and switch 
(task instruction identical to the previous trial vs. different) as within-group factors for the 
task set priming session, and prime congruency and switch as within-group factors for the 
repetition priming session. Analyses were performed on median correct response times. For 
the prime detection task, accuracy was analyzed with respect to prime recognition and 
compared to the chance level of 50 % using a t-test.  The signal detection theory was used to 
calculate the d’ index (index of signal detectability). 
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2.2 Results 
 Three subjects pointed out that bisyllabic words were inanimate or vice versa, which 
had lead them to respond always with a semantic task set and to reverse their response in the 
case of an “S” instruction. These three participants were excluded from the analyses. NB: For 
the sake of clarity, the results are presented in reverse order to the order in which the three 
tasks were administered.  
2.2.1 Awareness of primes. None of the 17 participants reported having seen the prime 
letter before the target during the priming experiments. When informed about the presence of 
the primes, 3 subjects thought they might have seen a slight blink, but were unsure, and no 
one thought it was a letter. No participants reported having seen the prime in the prime 
identification task. They spontaneously reported that they were not confident about their 
estimations and were only guessing.  Their performance in the forced-choice task ranged from 
41% to 59% and averaged 49.7%, which was not significantly different from chance, t(16)=-
0.24, p=0.81. The mean value of d’ was -0.013, which was not significantly different from 0 
(t(16)=-0.24, p=0.82). Mean accuracy for the 3 subjects who detected a flash was 50% and d’ 
was 0.01.  
2.2.2 Repetition priming. Figure 2 shows the median RTs averaged across subjects for 
each repetition priming condition. We found a significant main effect of prime congruency on 
reaction times (F(1,16)=64.5, p<0.001, 2=0.80). Subjects were quicker to identify the target 
letter (instruction) when the prime letter was the same as the instruction (442.2 ms versus 
482.8 ms when it was different). The mean size of the effect was 40.6 ms (8.7% of the median 
RT). All subjects displayed a repetition priming effect. A significant interaction between 
congruency and switch (F(1,16)=4.7, p<0.05, 2=0.23) indicated that the priming effect was 
greater when the instruction letters were the same between two subsequent trials (53.8 ms), 
than when there was a switch (31.2 ms). 
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2.2.3 Task set priming. Figure 2 displays the median RTs for correct responses 
averaged across subjects for each condition of congruency, task and switch. A significant 
main effect of task (F(1,16)=22.1, p<0.001, 2=0.58) was observed, with faster responses 
when participants performed a semantic judgment. A significant effect of the switch 
(F(1,16)=13.1, p<0.005, 2=0.45) was also observed, with faster responses when two 
consecutive trials involved the same task. There was neither a main effect of prime 
congruency (F(1,16)=0.27, p=0.6, 2=0.017), nor a significant interaction with any other 
factor. 
A similar analysis of response accuracy resulted in a significant main effect of switch 
(F(1,16)=13.6, p<0.005). The overall accuracy level was high (96.5%), indicating that 
participants performed the task properly.  
 
< Insert Figure 2 about here > 
 
3. Experiment 2 
We found no task set priming in Experiment 1, when the stimulus onset asynchrony 
between the prime and the instruction was set at 36 ms. In the experiment conducted by Lau 
and Passingham (2007), the task set priming was found when the SOA was 84 ms, but not 
when it was 36 ms, even though the prime was then conscious. These results suggest the 
interval between the prime and the instruction may be decisive for task set priming. In a 
second experiment, we used an interval similar to Lau and Passingham in their experiment 
(2007) to ascertain whether task set priming occurs in these conditions. 
3.1 Methods 
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3.1.1 Participants. Twenty students from the University of Strasbourg (10 women, 10 
men), aged from 23 to 30 (M=23.6, SD=2.0), took part in the experiment.  Their level of 
education ranged from 12 to 16 years (M=14.8, SD=1.47). As in the previous experiment, all 
of the participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They all took part in one 90-
minute session. Their informed written consent was obtained before the study in accordance 
with the recommendations set out in the Helsinki Declaration. 
3.1.2 Experimental procedure. The only difference in relation to Experiment 1 was the 
time course of the mask and instruction letter as shown in Figure 1. To increase the SOA 
between prime and instruction, without modifying the masking procedure, the instruction 
appeared not in the same time as the mask, but 48 ms after the mask onset. The instruction 
duration (154 ms) was the same as in Experiment 1. The mask was displayed until the 
instruction offset. Thus, the SOA between prime and mask remained at 36 ms, guaranteeing 
an excellent invisibility of the primes, but this time the SOA between prime and instruction 
letter was increased to 84 ms. We also ensured there was a constant interval between the 
onsets of the prime and the target word by slightly shortening the blank separating the 
instruction and the word (Figure 1). As a result, the word appeared 344 ms after the prime, 
like in Experiment 1.  
3.2 Results  
3.2.1 Awareness of primes. Four subjects pointed out that bisyllabic words were 
inanimate or vice versa, leading them to respond always with a semantic task set and to 
reverse their response in the case of an “S” instruction. One participant’s results were 
incoherent, with abnormally long and variable RTs (median RT=1265 ms, SD=690; compared 
to 727 ms and mean SD of 283 for the other 15 subjects). These five participants were 
excluded from the analyses. 
UNCONSCIOUS TASK SET PRIMING  15  
 
As in Experiment 1, none of the 15 participants reported having seen the prime letter 
before the target during the priming experiments. When told about the presence of the primes, 
2 subjects said  they thought they might have seen a slight blink but were unsure, and none 
thought it was a letter. Performance in the forced-choice task ranged from 42% to 60% and 
averaged 49.8%, which was not significantly different from chance, t(14)=-0.15, p=0.88. The 
mean value of d’ was 0. 075 (not significantly different from 0: t(14)=0.784, p=0.45). Mean 
accuracy for the 2 subjects who detected a flash was 49% and mean d’ was -0.051. 
3.2.2 Repetition priming.  The results of the repetition priming are presented in 
Figure 4. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of prime congruency (F(1,14)=6.9, 
p<0.05, 2=0.33) and switch (F(1,14)=8.2, p<0.05, 2=0.37). No significant interaction was 
observed between prime congruency and switch (F(1,14)=0.028, p=0.87, 2=0.002). 
Participants responded more quickly if the prime was the same as the instruction (437.6 ms) 
than if it was different (459.3). The mean extent of the priming effect was 21.7 ms. 
Participants also responded faster if the instruction was the same rather than different for two 
consecutive trials (437.9 ms versus 456.2 ms).  
3.2.3 Task set priming. Figure 3 shows the median RTs for correct responses averaged 
across subjects for each condition in the task set priming procedure. A significant main effect 
of task (F(1,14)=14.9, p<0.005, 2=0.52) was observed, with faster responses when 
participants made a semantic judgment. A significant effect of the switch (F(1,14)=15.2, 
p<0.005, 2=0.52) was also observed, with faster responses when the same instruction was 
used for two consecutive trials. Crucially, we now observed a significant main effect of prime 
congruency (F(1,14)=9.44, p<0.01, 2=0.40), evidence that a subliminal prime identical to the 
conscious instruction produced a faster response than when the prime differed from the 
instruction. The only significant interaction was a switch-by-task interaction (F(1,14)=8.76, 
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p<0.05, 2=0.38): in the phonological task, the switch-related slowdown was more 
pronounced.  
Accuracy was high (98.2 %), and no significant main effects or interaction were 
observed for response accuracy.  

< Insert Figure 3 about here > 
 
To check whether behavioral priming effects were greater in the case of participants 
who performed better in the prime visibility task, correlations were calculated between task 
set priming and prime identification performance. The correlations were based on the use of 
raw scores in the forced-choice task used to explore the awareness of primes on the one hand, 
and on the extent of task set priming, i.e. the difference between RTs for congruent and 
incongruent trials, in the different conditions of switch and task on the other hand. There were 
no significant correlations either for the whole group (r=-0.27, p=0.33), or when the analyses 
included only the 8 participants whose prime identification performance was greater than 0.5 
were included in the analyses (r=0.19, p=0.66).   
 
We conducted another correlation analysis, to check whether the repetition priming was 
correlated to the task set priming. The extent of task set priming was not correlated with that 
of repetition priming, i.e. the difference between RTs for congruent and incongruent trials 
during the repetition priming task (r=0.145, p=0.61). 
 
3.2.4 Comparison with Experiment 1.  In order to compare the two experiments, we 
conducted ANOVAs with repeated measures with the same within-group factors, and with the 
experiment as a between-group factor. There was no significant difference between the mean 
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accuracy or d’ value in prime identification (F(1.30)=0.008, p=0.93, 2=0). However, in the 
repetition priming task, we observed a significant interaction between congruency and 
experiment (F(1,30)=8.87, p<0.005, 2=0.23). The repetition priming effect we observed was 
greater when the SOA prime-instruction was 36 ms rather than 84 ms. The same analysis 
conducted on the task set priming task revealed a triple interaction between the experiment, 
congruency and switch factors (F(1,30)=4.28, p<0.05, 2=0.12). There was no other 
significant interaction involving the experiment factor. The significant interaction between the 
experiment, congruency and switch factors was decomposed by means of sub-analyses. The 
effect of congruency was significantly different across experiments in the no-switch 
condition, as shown by an ANOVA (F(1,30)=5.71, p<0.05, 2=0.16). The task set priming 
effect was greater in the no-switch condition for Experiment 2 (24 ms) than for Experiment 1 
(-8 ms), i.e. when the SOA between prime and instruction was 84 ms rather than 36 ms.  
4. Discussion 
The primary aim of the present study was to investigate whether control processes, and 
in particular those involved in establishing task sets, are modulated by unconscious stimuli. 
We explored this question in experimental conditions where a strong masking procedure 
ensured the prime was not consciously perceived, and where there were no trials involving 
conscious primes that attracted attention to their existence.  The second aim was to clarify 
whether the task-set priming effect requires some delay before it can occur. The results 
showed that in strict experimental conditions (i) participants were faster to make a 
semantic/syllabic judgment when the instruction was preceded by a congruent prime in 
Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1, and (ii) the prime congruency accelerated 
identification of the target letter in both experiments, but this repetition priming effect was 
greater in Experiment 1 than Experiment 2.  
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Both subjective and objective measures showed that priming effects occurred in 
conditions where participants were not aware that a prime had been presented before the 
explicit cue telling them which task to perform.  No participant reported having identified or 
even perceived a prime, and the d’ resulting from the prime identification task were at chance 
level. Moreover, there was no correlation between the priming effect and the prime 
awareness. Taken together, these results suggest the task set priming effect observed in 
Experiment 2 does not arise from a minimal level of conscious prime perception by some of 
the participants in the study. However, it could be due to a repetition priming effect, which 
would mean that participants identify the instruction that has already been subliminally 
presented more quickly and thus they respond faster to the task instruction. If this were the 
case, faster reaction times would reflect perceptual priming rather than task set priming.  
Before discussing this alternative, we shall first turn our attention to the differences in 
repetition priming effects observed between Experiment 1 and 2 and compare them to results 
previously reported in the literature.  
Consistent with previous studies (Arguin & Bub, 1995; Neumann & Klotz, 1994), the 
subliminal primes were found to affect identification of the conscious instruction letter in the 
repetition priming procedure in both experiments, with shorter RTs when the prime was 
congruent, as opposed to incongruent, with the instruction. However, the extent of this 
repetition priming effect was greater in Experiment 1 than Experiment 2, when the lag 
between the prime and target was shorter (36 ms and 84 ms in Experiment 1 and 2, 
respectively). The suggestion is that the repetition priming effect dwindles over time. In a 
word naming task, Ferrand (1996) also showed that the masked repetition priming effect 
dissipated when the prime-target interval increased. However, this decrease occurred with 
prime-target intervals of 500 ms and 1000 ms whereas the priming effect remained strong 
with 50 ms and 150 ms intervals. With shorter intervals, in the range of those used in the 
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present study, Vorberg et al. (2003) reported a heightening of the priming effect when the 
prime-target interval increased.  It is to be noted, however, that they used a metacontrast 
masking in which the mask is also the target. The increase in the prime-target interval was 
therefore associated with an increase in the delay between the prime and the mask, which 
could have induced deeper processing of the prime. Indeed, according to Vorberg et al., even 
if the participants were never able to accurately discriminate the shape from the prime, as the 
prime-mask interval increased they became better at detecting the presence of a prime. Other 
studies that used prime-target intervals as short as those used in the present experiments 
reported results consistent with our findings. For example, Lignau and Vorberg (2005), used a 
masked priming task in which the interval between the prime and the mask remained constant 
(70 ms) and showed that the priming effect decreased when the prime-target SOA increased 
from 70 ms to 154 ms. Schlaghecken and Eimer (1997) observed the same tendency with 
pattern masking, when the prime and the target were peripheral. The decrease in the repetition 
priming effect between our two experiments could also be related to differences in the mask 
duration, which was longer in Experiment 2 (200 ms) than in Experiment 1 (152 ms) 
(Hashimoto et al., 2006). 
Whatever the explanation for the changes in the repetition priming effect depending on 
the prime-target SOA, an important finding from our study was the dissociation between the 
repetition priming effect and the task set priming effect. When the prime-instruction interval 
increased from 36 ms to 84 ms, the repetition priming effect decreased whereas the task set 
priming effect increased (Figure 4). This dissociation argues against the hypothesis that these 
two priming effects are subtended by the same mechanism. It is further supported by the lack 
of correlation between the repetition priming effect and the task set priming effect, the 
suggestion being that faster identification of the letter induced by the prime was not a 
determining factor in the task set priming. To sum up, our findings from Experiments 1 and 2 
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are evidence that task set activation can be affected by a prime that participants do not 
consciously perceive, independently of a possible perceptual repetition priming effect. This 
conclusion is consistent with a study conducted by Reuss et al. (2011) which showed that a 
task set can be activated by subliminal information even when perceptual priming of the task 
cue cannot take place. In their study, Reuss et al. dropped the prime and manipulated the 
visibility of the task cue so that participants consciously perceived it in some trials but not in 
others. Stimuli were one-digit numbers. Task cues (w or b) indicated to participants that they 
were to perform either a parity task (odd or even) or a magnitude task (less or greater than 5). 
When cues were rendered invisible, subjects were instructed to choose freely which task they 
carried out. The results showed that even when they were not aware of the task cue, 
participants chose the cued task more often than the non-cued task and performed it more 
quickly.  
 
 < Insert Figure 4 about here > 
 
The task set priming effect occurred in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1. 
Participants were equally unaware of the presence of a prime in both experiments, which 
means the explanation cannot reside in differences in conscious perception of the prime from 
one experiment to the next. In contrast, the time between the onset of the prime and the onset 
of the instruction increased from 36 ms to 84 ms between Experiments 1 and 2.  Mattler 
(2003) showed that priming of cognitive control operations did not occur when the prime-cue 
SOA was set at 34 ms or 51 ms but increased linearly when the SOA increased from 68 ms to 
119 ms. Taken together, these findings suggest the time interval between the prime and the 
task cue has to be long enough to allow a task set priming. This interpretation is also 
consistent with the results obtained by Lau and Passingham, which showed no task set 
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priming effect when the prime was consciously perceived but the delay between the prime 
and the instruction was as short as 16 ms.  
We have to consider a limitation to this interpretation which stems from differences 
across our two experiments in the interval between the consciously perceived instruction letter 
and the word to be processed. When the SOA between prime and instruction letter increased 
from 36 ms to 84 ms, the interval between the instruction letter and the word changed in the 
opposite direction (308 ms in Experiment 1 versus 260 ms in Experiment 2). Therefore, the 
possibility that the task priming effect also occurred in Experiment 1 but then dissipated 
because the word occurred later relative to when the task instruction was presented cannot be 
ruled out.  In Lau and Passingham (2007), however, the interval between the instruction and 
the word remained constant even when the interval between the prime and the instruction 
changed. Thus, this second explanation cannot account for the absence of a task priming 
effect in their short prime-instruction condition. Consequently, it seems unlikely that a 
decrease in the instruction-word interval is the sole explanation for all of our results. Our own 
data also suggest otherwise. When the interval between the instruction letter and the word is 
shorter, there is less time to initiate the task set. This could explain the greater influence of the 
unconscious prime in Experiment 2. However, if the instruction-word delay is crucial, the task 
set priming effect should be greater when the task set is the most difficult to initiate after the 
instruction. In fact, difficulty initiating the task set should reduce the instruction-word delay 
still further. In our case, this situation is typical of the phonological task: to count the number 
of syllables when reading is not a natural task. The task set should be even more difficult in 
the switch condition, i.e. when the phonological task has to be initiated after a semantic task 
trial, but, in reality, the results are not consistent with this prediction. On the contrary, they 
show that the task set priming tends to be greater when the instruction-induced task setting is 
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the easiest, i.e. in the repeated (no switch) trials and in the semantic task. This suggests the 
instruction-word delay is not the key factor. 
The task set priming effect we observed was small (15 ms) and, in particular, smaller 
than the effect reported by Lau and Passingham (2007), which they estimated at 100 ms. Even 
if the priming effect reported by Mattler (2003), 45 ms, is more similar to our own, the 
difference in relation to the effect found by Lau and Passingham is important. The first 
explanation for it could be that in Lau and Passingham study participants were not completely 
unaware of the presentation of the prime since their d’ measurements were higher than ours. 
The attention the participants gave the primes could be another critical factor. In our 
paradigm, they were not told about the presence of primes until the end of the task set priming 
experiment and, in contrast to the study conducted by Lau and Passingham, there were no 
trials with conscious primes. It has previously been shown that attention can influence the 
effect of unconscious primes (Greenwald, Abrams, Naccache, & Dehaene, 2003; Naccache et 
al., 2002). For instance, Naccache et al. (2002) showed that unattended primes might fail to 
elicit priming effects. Therefore, it could be argued that the presence of trials in which primes 
were perceived consciously, as in the study by Lau and Passingham, caused participants to 
attend to the primes, and thus yielded larger priming effects than in the present study.  
Importantly, in our experiments, participants were trained and prepared to perform 
frequent task switching. The prime may thus have prompted them to switch between two task 
sets which were simultaneously active. In other words, the prime may not have triggered the 
whole preparation of a task set, but merely the choice whether or not to initiate a task switch 
(Meiran, 2000). Cognitive control has been modeled as consisting of several nested 
components, with the frontal cortex organized functionally as a cascade of control processes 
(Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003). The higher level is related to episodic control, which 
enables the subject to establish new task sets, according to previous events or ongoing internal 
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goals. Because both task sets were already consciously prepared, and indeed perhaps 
routinized, this level would not be the one activated subliminally in our paradigm.  Instead, 
our paradigm would implement a contextual control stage (Koechlin et al., 2003). The 
unconscious task set priming we observed might be related to the selection of one of the two 
task sets already activated. This suggests the need to split cognitive control into distinct 
components differentially related to conscious processing. While task set and goal changing 
decisions may be partially initiated subliminally, the present results leave open the question of 
whether other cognitive control operations are influenced by unconscious stimuli. 
5. Conclusion 
Our results confirmed that unconscious task set priming is possible for high level 
cognitive processes. By controlling unconscious conditions better, with a shorter prime, we 
were able to reproduce and extend the results obtained by Lau and Passingham (2007). The 
extent of our task set priming was smaller but significant. In future, it would be useful to 
combine our paradigm with high temporal resolution cerebral recordings in order to identify 
the precise neural mechanisms of task set priming. Even if our findings confirm the existence 
of an unconscious modulation of cognitive control, it remains to be seen whether all 
prefrontal cognitive control systems can be activated unconsciously, without concomitant 
conscious control.  
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Footnotes 
1
 Although the formulation in Dehaene & Naccache (2001) is ambiguous, the workspace 
model does not preclude rule out the possibility that automatic bottom-up effects of an 
unconscious stimulus T1 may bias the choice of a cognitive strategy applied, in turn, to a 
second target T2. What is ruled out is that an unconscious stimulus T1 changes the strategy 
applied to itself, as this would imply a closed bottom-up and top-down loop, which, in the 
global neuronal workspace model, is deemed to imply reverberating ignition and therefore 
conscious perception. Thus, the present data do not strictly imply rejection of the global 
workspace model.
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Figure 1. Stimuli and procedure of Experiments 1 and 2. The stimuli consisted of a prime 
letter (A or S), masked by the next four letters, the instruction letter (A or S), and then the 
word. The prime was congruent or incongruent with the instruction letter. The two 
experiments differed in the interval between the prime and the instruction letter. The 
participants performed three tasks in succession (in three blocks). First, they performed the 
“task set priming” task, in which they had to make either a phonological judgment (bisyllabic 
or not) or semantic judgment (animate/inanimate) on the following word, according to the 
instruction letter. Then, they performed the “repetition priming” task, in which they had to 
identify the instruction letter, and, then, finally, they attempted to identify the prime letter, so 
that we could check whether or not they were aware of the prime (“prime detection”). 
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Figure 2. Median response time for correct responses (in ms) averaged across subjects in the 
task set priming procedure in Experiment 1 (prime-instruction SOA=36ms) (17 subjects). The 
results are displayed as a function of whether task switching occurred relative to the previous 
trial, of the type of task, and of congruency of the prime with the explicit instruction. Vertical 
bars denote +/- standard errors. 
A main effect of task type (p<0.001) and a main effect of the switch (p<0.005) were observed. 
However, there was no significant difference in response times between when the subliminal 
prime was congruent and when it was incongruent with the explicit instruction. 
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Figure 3. Median response time for correct responses (in ms) averaged across subjects in the 
task set priming procedure in Experiment 2 (prime-instruction SOA=84ms) (15 subjects). 
Same format as Figure 2.  
A main effect of task set type (p<0.005) and a main effect of the switch (p<0.005) were 
observed, as in Experiment 1. Moreover, there was a significant reduction in response times 
when the subliminal prime was congruent with the explicit instruction, relative to the 
incongruent condition (p<0.01). 
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Figure 4. Comparison of the priming effect (incongruent RT – congruent RT) for the 
repetition priming procedure and the task set priming procedure between Experiments 1 
(SOA=36ms) and 2 (SOA=84ms). As the prime-instruction stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
lengthens from 36 ms to 84 ms, the repetition priming effect decreases, whereas the task set 
priming increases. 
 
 
